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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Many researchers have studied the impact of ownership identity and concentration on the
performance of corporations. Berle and Means (1932) find a positive association between
ownership concentration and accounting profitability. Jensen and Meckling (1976) are the
pioneers of research on the agency problem faced by owners of the corporation. Authors
of the early essays focus on the conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers of
the type that is found in Anglo-Saxon institutional environments. A corporation’s shares are
widely dispersed, so that no outside shareholder has a strong incentive to monitor managers
carefully; managers do not hold large percentages of the shares, and thus do not have the
same financial interest in the company as the shareholders. Subsequently, extensive research
has been conducted on the consequences of the agency problem of the corporation.
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) study the relationship between percentage
shareholdings of the board of directors and Tobin’s q for the Fortune Five Hundred magazine
corporations in the United States of America (USA). They use board ownership as a proxy
for managerial ownership and argue that managerial ownership has two conflicting effects
namely, an alignment effect and an entrenchment effect, which are explained below:
• Alignment effect: The alignment effect draws on the convergence of interests
hypothesis. The higher the percentage shareholding of the board members, the higher is
the positive effect of a rise in the company’s value on their assets, which enhances their
4
Corporate Governance
wealth.
• Entrenchment effect: The higher the percentage shareholding of the board members, the
lesser is the likelihood of them being replaced through a proxy fight or hostile takeover.
This is referred to as entrenchment and results in higher discretion of the members to
pursue their own goals.
Large shareholders address the agency problem of the company due to their incentives
and ability to exert control over its operations. The behavior of large shareholders is
modeled comprehensively in the study of Stulz (1988). He predicts a concave relationship
between managerial ownership and firm value. In his model, the entrenchment effect of large
shareholders becomes stronger than the alignment (incentive) effect as the shareholdings
exceed a certain level, beyond which the large shareholders are able to block value-enhancing
takeovers. The interpretation of these non-linear relationship patterns between ownership
concentration and average q (Tobin’s q) is that a single variable of ownership concentration
captures the alignment effect as well as the entrenchment effect.
The literature suggests that the relationship between managerial ownership and company
value is essentially non-linear in nature. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny report evidence of a
nonlinear relationship between percentage shareholdings of the board of directors and the
average q (Tobin’s q) of the company. Average q (Tobin’s q) rose from 0.75 when the board
held no shares to slightly above 1.0 when it held 5 percent, and then fell reaching a value of
only 0.70 at a holding of 25 percent of outstanding shares. From this point onwards average
q (Tobin’s q) rises again.
A number of studies report similar up/down/up relationships between ownership concen-
tration and company performance (examples are Short and Keasey, 1999, McConnell and
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Servaes, 1990, and Stulz, 1988). Short and Keasey (1999) analyze the relationship between
managerial ownership and performance of 225 corporations in the United Kingdom. They
measure company performance by the return on equity and the market to book ratios.
For both measures of performance, the coefficients on directors’ shareholding, square of
directors’ shareholding and cube of directors’ shareholding are positive, negative and positive
respectively and all are statistically significant.
McConnell and Servaes (1990) study a large sample of US companies and report an
up/down relationship between managerial ownership and corporate performance as measured
by average q (Tobin’s q). They report an up/down relationship between managerial ownership
and average q (Tobin’s q). In other words, they observe only the first part of the inverted
parabola in their data.
Lemmon and Lins (2003) use a sample of 800 companies from eight Asian emerging
market countries to analyze the effect of ownership structure on average q (Tobin’s q) during
the Asian financial crisis. They observe deviations of cash flow rights from voting rights,
which give an incentive to the controlling shareholders to expropriate outside shareholders.
The crisis gave incentives to the controlling shareholders to expropriate outside shareholders
because of a negative shock to the investment opportunities of the companies. They report that
the average q ratios of companies that have a control-ownership disparity decline 12 percent
more than the q ratios of other companies during the crisis, which began in July 1997 and
ended in August 1998.
Kumar (2008) analyzes panel data of 2754 Indian companies for a period of 6 years (1994-
2000). He uses return on assets (ROA) as the measure of company performance. In his study,
institutional investors affect company performance positively once their ownership crosses
6
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the threshold level of 15 percent. The shareholdings of the directors’ influence performance
positively beyond the threshold of 21 percent, which is consistent with the fact that many
Indian corporations are family dominated enterprises. The above-mentioned thresholds are
the minimum points of the U-shaped relationship estimated by him (please refer to chapter 3
for a detailed review of studies on India.
Chen, Cheung, Stouraitis and Wong (2005) analyze the ownership structures and financial
data of 412 Hong Kong based companies for the 1995 to 1998 period. They arrive at non-
linear relationships between family ownership and company value and accounting perfor-
mance measures of the down/up/down pattern but the effects are only marginally significant.
They are no significant effects of ownership variables on dividend payouts. However, they
show a significantly negative relationship between payouts and family ownership of up to 10
percent.
Mak and Kusnadi (2005) report that the impact of insider shareholdings on average q
(Tobin’s q) is insignificant in Malaysia. They find that block shareholdings have a low positive
effect on average q (Tobin’s q), which is marginally significant. Tam and Tan (2007) report
that foreign-owned companies have better accounting performance and higher valuations.
In terms of accounting performance, individual controlled companies outperform only the
government-owned companies. When average q (Tobin’s q) is the measure of performance,
the individual controlled companies fare better than both the government-owned and trust-
owned companies.
Ang and Ding (2006) term the companies owned and controlled by Temasak Holdings (the
government holding entity) as government linked companies (GLCs) and report that they have
higher valuations and better corporate governance than a control group of non-GLCs.
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Yeh, Lee and Woidtke (2001) use data from 1994-95 on a sample of 208 Taiwanese listed
companies for studying the impact of ownership concentration on financial performance.
Family-controlled companies with high levels of control have lower financial performance
than family-controlled companies with low levels of control and companies that have
dispersed ownership.
Wiwattanakantang (2001) shows that the presence of controlling shareholders is associ-
ated with better accounting performance for Thai companies. According to her argument,
ownership is positively associated with performance partly due to the low intensity of
agency problem in the family owned companies. In her view, Thai companies do not adopt
pyramidal ownership structures, which is the reason for the low agency problem. However, the
performance of family owned companies is lower when the controlling owner has a 25 percent
to 50 percent shareholding stake in the company. Kim, Kitsabrunnarat and Nofsinger (2004)
report that the operating performance of Thai companies deteriorates after initial public
offerings (IPOs), and that the magnitude of the decrease in performance is much greater in
Thailand as compared to the USA. They arrive at a non-linear relationship pattern (up, down,
up) between managerial ownership and post-IPO change in performance that is consistent
with the entrenchment and the alignment effects. The entrenchment effect is dominant in the
range of ownership from 31 percent to 71 percent.
Joh (2003) uses a large sample of Korean companies, for estimating the relationship
between ownership structures and accounting performance. The measure of accounting
performance is the net income to assets ratio. She shows that ownership concentration
has a substantial positive impact on accounting performance. However, companies with
high control-ownership disparity have lower performance. This effect is especially true for
8
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companies that are members of the top 30 chaebols. The results of Joh’s study show that the
impact of ownership on accounting performance is non-linear. In the interval below 5 percent
company performance declines with ownership, whereas it increases sharply in the interval
from 5 percent to 25 percent. Above the 25 percent level, performance increases gradually
with ownership concentration.
Xu and Wang (1999) analyze the ownership and financial data of all companies listed on the
Shanghai and Shenzen stock exchanges over the 1993 to 1995 period and report a positive and
significant correlation between ownership concentration and profitability. According to them,
the impact of ownership concentration on profitability is stronger for companies dominated
by legal person shareholders than for those dominated by the state. Specifically, profitability
is positively correlated with the percentage of legal person shareholdings but it is either
negatively correlated or uncorrelated with the percentage of state shares and shares held by
individuals.
Sun, Tong, and Tong (2002) report that ownership concentration has a positive impact on
partially privatized state-owned corporations. Keeping in view the situation, where state-
owned enterprises are non-performing and also highly indebted, it is logical to argue that
too much control is bad for these enterprises. On the other hand, very low state ownership
in China means a lack of political support and business connections, which are essential for
ensuring performance.
Liu and Sun (2003) argue that the absence of state-shares in the pattern of shareholding
disclosed in a company’s annual report does not necessarily indicate the non-existence of the
ultimate control by the state. According to their analysis, the class of legal shares is only a
veil of various identities of ultimate owners including both state and private. Whether and
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to what extent this ambiguity dilutes the findings on the impact of shareholding classes on
performance is difficult to predict. According to Jiang, Laurenceson and Tang (2008), the
state-owned share proportion has a linear and positive impact on accounting performance.
Chen, Firth, and Xu (2008) analyze the identities of different state agencies from the per-
spective of controlling owners and linked ownership identity to performance. The operating
efficiency of Chinese listed companies varies across the type of controlling shareholder. The
companies controlled by the state-owned enterprises affiliated to the central government have
the best performance followed by the companies controlled by the local government. Private-
owned companies and companies owned by the state asset management bureaus have the
worst performance.
According to Cueto (2008), higher voting rights held by the dominant shareholders are
associated with lower average q (Tobin’s q) in 170 companies from Brazil, Chile, Columbia,
Peru, and Venezuela. The ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights held by the dominant
shareholder is significantly associated with higher q values and this effect is twice as large in
fixed effect regressions.
Carvalhal da Silva and Leal (2006) analyze the ownership structures and financials of 236
Brazilian companies. They report that average q (Tobin’s q) and ROA are positively related
to cash flow rights concentration and negatively related to voting rights concentration and to
the separation of voting rights from cash flow rights. The sample companies controlled by the
government, foreign, and institutional investors generally have significantly higher valuation
and performance than those owned by families.
Martinez, Stohr and Quiroga (2007) use a sample of 100 family-owned companies and
75 non-family owned companies for evaluating the impact of family ownership on the
10
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performance of Chilean companies. According to them, the family-owned companies perform
significantly better in terms of both accounting performance and company value. However,
the results of this study were based on mean comparison tests without proper controls for
other effects.
Chapter 2 comprises of analyses of the corporate governance regime in Pakistan and the
ownership structures of corporations. Chapter 3 contains an empirical analysis of the effects of
ownership concentration on performance. In chapter 4, I use a marginal return on investment,
namely a marginal q, for testing hypotheses on investment performance and estimating the
relationship between ownership concentration and performance. The performance of family-
owned companies is compared with the performance of foreign-owned and state-owned
companies. Furthermore, I present evidence on the agency problem of entrenchment.
11
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CHAPTER 2
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN PAKISTANI
CORPORATIONS
ABSTRACT
For studying corporate governance in Pakistan, two sets of institutions are analyzed. Firstly,
I study the corporate governance structure of Pakistan as defined by its legal system i.e.
the rules governing the election of directors, and composition of the company boards,
takeovers, and other legal institutions and regulatory measures that affect the behavior
of largest shareholders. The measures taken by the corporate and banking regulators for
better disclosure of information in audited financial statements as well as for improving the
quality of external audits are explained. Secondly, I analyze the identities and percentage
shareholdings of largest shareholders of corporations. The stakes of largest shareholders equal
to 20 percent or above for 97 percent of the companies, which depicts a high degree of
ownership concentration. Applying the concept of ultimate ownership shows that families
own 55 percent of the companies. Foreign investors and the state own 34.40 percent and
10.40 percent respectively.
2.1 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Under the heading of corporate governance institutions fall many things. Some institutions
will be common to all companies in a country, like the laws and legal institutions of a country.
12
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Others, like the number of members of the board of directors and the percentage of the board
filled by independent directors, will differ from company to company within a country.
Before analyzing the corporate governance structure of Pakistan, I describe legal systems
from the perspective of shareholder protection. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and
Vishny (1997, 1998) examine the content and historical development of legal institutions in
different countries to determine, which ones best align shareholder and managerial interests.
They conclude that the common law systems found in the Anglo-Saxon countries and former
British colonies offer outside and minority shareholders greater protection against abuse of
authority by managers than do civil law systems. Within the civil law systems, La Porta et
al. differentiate between the system in the Scandinavian countries, and in those whose legal
systems have a German or French origin. They claim that the Scandinavian system offers
shareholders the best protection among the three civil law systems, while the French system
provides shareholders the least protection among the three.
La Porta et al. (1997, 1998) have collected data pertaining to 49 countries on the legal
rights of investors and their quality of enforcement. They analyze seven shareholder rights
i.e. one-share-one-vote and six anti director rights. The anti director rights are the right of
shareholders to mail proxy votes to the company, the possibility of cumulative voting for
election of directors or mechanisms for proportional representation of minority interests on
the board, existence of legal mechanisms against perceived oppression, preemptive right to
new issues of shares, no requirement for shareholders to deposit their shares prior to the
general shareholders’ meeting and a low percentage of share capital required for calling an
extraordinary shareholders’ meeting. The right to a mandatory dividend is also considered as
a substitute mechanism to protect minority shareholders. They aggregate shareholder rights
13
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in each of the 49 countries by constructing an index labeled as anti director rights. The index
is formed by allotting a score of either one or zero for each of the anti director rights measure
discussed above. Pakistan received a score of 5 in this index.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny argue that concentration of ownership
mitigates conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in those
countries, where investor protection is low. If the legal system of a country does not protect the
interests and rights of the investors they are reluctant to invest in the shares of corporations.
Thus, low investor protection adversely affects the development of the financial markets
because the investors are reluctant to invest in the financial instruments issued by corporations
(see La Porta et al., 2002).
La Porta et al., (1998) express the view that measurement of creditor rights is more
complicated. Since, there are different types of creditors, protecting one group might harm
others. They also deal with the liquidation and reorganization aspects of creditor rights. They
construct an index of creditor rights by adding one when (1) the country imposes restrictions,
such as creditors’ consent of minimum dividends to file for reorganization; (2) secured
creditors are able to gain possession of their security once the reorganization petition has been
approved (no automatic stay); (3) secured creditors are ranked first in the distribution of the
proceeds that result from the disposition of the assets of a bankrupt company; and the debtor
does not retain the administration of its property pending resolution of the reorganization.
To measure the strength of enforcement, La Porta et al., (1998) consider five measures
that proxy law and order in different countries and also estimate the quality of a country’s
accounting standards. The law and order measures used by them were compiled by private
credit risk agencies for the use of foreign investors interested in doing business abroad. These
14
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measures are the efficiency of the judicial system, corruption, risk of expropriation by the
government, law and order, and likelihood of contract repudiation by the government.
La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny argue that concentration of ownership
mitigates conflict between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in those
countries, where investor protection is low. If the legal system of a country does not protect the
interests and rights of the investors they are reluctant to invest in the shares of corporations.
Thus, low investor protection adversely affects the development of the financial markets
because the investors are reluctant to invest in the financial instruments issued by corporations
(see La Porta et al., 2002). La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) predict that the
common-law approach to the social control of economic life performs better than the civil-
law approach in a world economy, which is free of war, financial crisis, and extraordinary
disturbances.
2.2 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF PAKISTAN
A sound institutional framework is a precondition for an effective corporate governance
system. It is frequently argued that a strong institutional set up can foster transparency,
accountability, equity and fairness. In Pakistan, the capital market regulatory institutions
are the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE),
Lahore Stock Exchange (LSE) and Islamabad Stock Exchange (ISE). The State Bank of
Pakistan (the Central Bank) being the regulator of the banking system, is responsible for
the supervision of the scheduled commercial banks and development finance institutions.
Pakistan is a jurisdiction with an English-origin legal system in place by reason of conquest.
All statutes in Pakistan are based on common law. Companies ordinance, 1984 is the statute
for regulation of corporations in Pakistan. The listed companies (substantial acquisition of
15
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voting shares and takeovers) ordinance 2008 stipulates takeover and ownership disclosure
rules. In addition to the listing rules and the requirements of disclosures, this ordinance
includes special regulations on transfer pricing. Among other things, the listed companies are
required to inform the stock exchanges about dividends, annual general meetings (AGMs),
capital increases and changes in their boards of directors.
The Securities and Exchange Ordinance was promulgated in 1969, which is the primary
legislation for the regulation of the capital market. The Securities and Exchange Ordinance
1969 is the securities law, which provides for the protection of investors, market regulation,
prevention of frauds and insider trading, and delisting of securities.
As per the Securities and Exchange Commission Act 1997, the Securities and Exchange
Commission of Pakistan (hereafter referred to as SECP) is the regulator of the non-
financial companies, the non-banking financial companies (NBFCs), insurance companies,
and modarabas (Islamic financial institutions). The Institute of Chartered Accountants of
Pakistan is the regulatory body for supervision of accounting practices.
Code of Corporate Governance
The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan notified the code of corporate
governance in April 2002. The primary objective of the code of corporate governance is
to ensure that the directors of a listed company supervise its operations for safeguarding the
interests of a diverse range of stakeholders. It lays down the requirement of restructuring of the
composition of board of directors for introducing representation of the minority shareholders.
The directors are required to discharge their fiduciary responsibilities in the larger interest of
all stakeholders in a transparent, informed, diligent, and timely manner. The code emphasizes
openness and transparency in the corporate affairs and decision-making process. It stresses
16
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on proper disclosure of performance and improvement in the external and internal audits of
companies. The main features of the code are described below:
• It encourages representation of non-executive directors and those representing minority
interests on the boards of directors of listed companies.
• It lays down the qualification and eligibility criteria for directors of listed companies.
• While reinforcing the powers, responsibilities and functions of the board of directors,
the code formalizes the corporate decision making process and requires adequate
documentation of policies and decisions of directors.
• It seeks to strengthen corporate working, internal control system and external audit
requirements of listed companies.
• Corporate and financial reporting framework has been re-defined to foster better
disclosure.
• Audit committees and internal audit functions are required to be established by all listed
companies.
Every listed company is required to report on a prescribed format the break-up of the
shareholding of various legal entities. Each company is also required to issue a statement
of compliance with the code in its published annual financial report. This statement certifies
about compliance with the provisions of the code regarding the system of internal controls, the
corporate and financial reporting requirements, appointment of directors and functioning of a
company’s board, appointment of company secretary and chief financial officer, functioning
of the internal audit department, and fulfillment of the statutory external audit requirements.
The code lays down the following requirements for the board of directors of a listed
company:
17
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• The board of directors of each listed company includes at least one independent
director. It has been elaborated that the expression independent means a director who
is not connected with the listed company or its promoters or directors on the basis of
family relationship and who does not have any other relationship, whether pecuniary
or otherwise, with the listed company, its associated companies, directors, executives
or related parties. The test of independence principally emanates from the fact whether
such person can be perceived as being able to exercise independent business judgment
without being subservient to any apparent form of interference.
• Executive directors are not more than 75 percent of the elected directors including the
chief executive. This condition does not apply to scheduled commercial Banks, which
are required by the Central Bank to have not more than 25 percent of the directors as
paid executives of the bank (please refer to the section on Corporate Governance in the
Financial Sector for a description of the requirements for appointment of directors of
banks and development finance institutions).
• With regard to the qualification and eligibility to act as director, the following conditions
have been specified:
– No listed company shall have as a director, a person who is serving as a director of
ten other listed companies.
– No person shall be elected or nominated as a director of a listed company if:
∗ his name is not borne on the register of national tax payers except where such
person is a non-resident; and
∗ he has been convicted by a court of competent jurisdiction as a defaulter in
payment of any loan to a commercial bank, a development financial institution
18
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or a non-banking financial institution or he, being a member of a stock
exchange, has been declared as a defaulter by the stock exchange; and
∗ A listed company shall endeavor that no person is elected or nominated as
a director if he or his spouse is engaged in the business of stock brokerage
(unless specifically exempted by the SECP).
The requirements discussed above have been introduced to generate awareness of good
governance of listed companies.
The limitations of the code are the absence of specific provisions on risk management and
compensation policies pertaining to the board of directors.
Corporate Governance in the Financial Sector
Good corporate governance practices are necessary in financial companies for transparency
in their operations and protection of the interests of depositors, investors and creditors.
Scheduled commercial banks and development finance institutions in Pakistan are regulated
by the Central Bank (State Bank of Pakistan). Banking Companies Ordinance, 1962 is the
statute for the regulation of scheduled commercial banks (hereafter referred to as banks) and
development finance institutions.
The State Bank of Pakistan has taken several measures for improving corporate governance
in banks and development finance institutions. These measures are as follows:
• Family representation on the board of directors of banks and development finance
institutions has been limited to 25 percent of the total board size.
• To avoid possible conflict of interest and use of insider information, the directors and
officers of brokerage companies have been disallowed to serve on the board of directors
of banks and development finance institutions.
19
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• The appointments of the board members and chief executive officers of banks and
development finance institutions are screened so that they meet the fit and proper test
prescribed by the State Bank of Pakistan.
• A detailed set of guidelines has been issued for the board of directors to develop policies
and effectively oversee the management of banks and development finance institutions.
The banks and development finance institutions are required to comply with the Prudential
Regulations of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) for conducting their business activities.
The Prudential Regulations stipulate that an independent director is a person who is not
linked directly or indirectly with the bank or development finance institutions or its sponsoring
shareholders. For the purpose of such determination, an independent director is a director
who has not been employed by the bank or development finance institutions during the last
five years or by the external auditors or legal advisors of the bank or development finance
institutions.
Another requirement for an independent director is that the incumbent should not be an
employee of a subsidiary of the bank or development finance institutions or of a company
where the directors of the bank or development finance institutions have substantial beneficial
interest (20 percent or more shareholding of the director either on his own or combined with
his family members). Moreover, the director should not have been employed by a company of
which an executive officer of the bank or development finance institutions has been a director
within the last three years.
In addition to the requirements explained above, the banks and development finance
institutions are also required to adhere to the provisions of the code of corporate governance.
The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) started functioning in
20
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January 1999. At that time, the non-banking financial institutions comprised of separate
companies for providing services of investment finance, leasing, asset management, housing
finance, venture capital investment, and discounting services. For example, the business
of leasing finance could only be conducted by leasing companies. For this reason, there
was fragmentation in the non-bank financial sector and proliferation of institutions. These
financial institutions usually had inadequate capital, low access to technology, and a high cost
of operations, which increased their vulnerability to credit and market risk.
The primary objective of implementing the universal non-banking financial companies
(NBFC) regime was to consolidate the non-banking financial services sector by allowing
multiple financial activities under one umbrella, so that a variety of financial products tailored
to the needs of customers could be offered through a one-window operation.
The SECP notified the non-banking financial companies (establishment and regulation)
rules, 2003, which introduce the concept of a non-banking financial company (hereafter
referred to as NBFC). The NBFC is defined as a company licensed by SECP to provide
any one or more of the above-mentioned financial services.
An important measure for the protection of investors is that the SECP prohibited stock
brokers from providing asset management services from the platform of a stock brokerage
company in 2003. This regulatory action was taken to eliminate possible conflict of interest
in the operations of asset management companies. It specifies that stock brokerage companies
are required to establish separate companies for undertaking the business of asset management
and investment advisory services. As a consequence of the above discussed regulatory
measure, all the stock brokerage companies providing asset management and investment
advisory services incorporated new companies for undertaking this business. Fresh licenses
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were issued to these companies under the non-banking financial companies (establishment
and regulation) rules, 2003 (hereafter referred to as NBFC rules, 2003) after fulfillment of the
licensing requirements stipulated in these rules.
The SECP screens the credentials of the chief executive officer and directors of NBFCs
prior to their appointment. With regard to the subject of the independence of directors of
NBFCs, rule 7 of the NBFC rules, 2003 requires that at least one third of the directors be
independent. At least two of the directors, excluding the chief executive officer, should have
relevant experience of five years at the senior management level in the financial sector.
Disclosure and Auditing Requirements
The quality of a country’s accounting system is vital for the proper functioning of
its corporate governance regime. The accounting system in Pakistan is well established
and corporations are required to prepare their financial statements in accordance with the
international accounting standards.
In addition to the supervisory activities taken by the Institute of Chartered Accountants
of Pakistan, the corporate and financial regulators also take initiatives for strengthening of
audits of corporations in Pakistan. The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan has
developed a panel of auditors for auditing of companies in different sectors like non-banking
financial companies, insurance, non-financial listed companies and non-listed companies
having paid-up capital exceeding 7.5 million rupees. This panel is revised periodically for
improving the quality of external audits.
For improving the quality of external audits of banks and development finance institutions,
the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) maintains a panel of auditors under Section 35 of the Bank-
ing Companies Ordinance, 1962. SBP requires banks and development finance institutions to
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appoint their auditors from amongst this approved panel. The panel is periodically reviewed
by SBP to upgrade/ downgrade the existing audit firms on the basis of evidence regarding
them and also to accommodate new applicant audit firms.
An important way of improving disclosure by banks and development finance institutions
is assuring credibility of their financial statements. It is mandatory for banks and development
finance institutions to report the details of borrowers, and the amounts of loans, which have
been written-off during the year. Another important disclosure is provisions for bad debts
made during the year.
Disclosure of credit ratings of financial institutions to the general public is considered
a measure of transparency. Credit ratings are immensely valued by investors, creditors,
and regulators. Keeping in view this reason, the State Bank of Pakistan made credit rating
compulsory for banks and non-banking financial institutions in 2001. Banks and non-banking
financial institutions are required to disclose their credit ratings to the general public through
electronic and print media (refer to Husain, 2003).
2.3 SAMPLE SELECTION AND THE PROCESS OF INFORMATION COLLEC-
TION
I chose a sample of one hundred and twenty five companies listed on the Karachi Stock
Exchange (KSE) on the basis of market capitalization of 30th June 2006. It covers all
industries of the Pakistani economy except for financial institutions, whose capital is not
comparable with that of non-financial companies. The sample’s capitalization accounts for 98
percent of the total market capitalization of non-financial (hereafter referred to as industrial)
companies listed on KSE. The shares of the sample companies are actively traded on KSE.
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan’s rules require every listed company
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to disclose the number of its shares owned by legal entities in the annual financial report.
Published annual financial reports were solicited from the company secretaries as well as
from secondary sources. The secondary sources of the financial reports are given below:
• Elixir Securities, Jahangir Siddiqui Capital Markets, and First Capital Securities
Corporation, which are the premier stock brokerage companies in Pakistan.
• MCB Bank, Pakistan.
• Central Bank of Pakistan (State Bank of Pakistan).
• Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE), Lahore Stock Exchange (LSE), and Islamabad Stock
Exchange (ISE).
These sources provided hard copies of the financial reports, which were shifted to Vienna
by courier and post. The ownership information of private limited companies used in tracing
the ultimate ownership of the listed companies, was obtained from Securities and Exchange
Commission of Pakistan (SECP). Apart from the ownership information of private limited
companies, the ownership and financial data used in this dissertation was prepared manually
from the financial reports and ancillary sources of information.
The above discussion on the data sources and collection process, shows the accuracy and
reliability of the ownership information used in the analysis.
2.4 OWNERSHIP STRUCTURES OF PAKISTANI LISTED COMPANIES
The use of security design is a way around the one-share/ one-vote principle. Sponsors
can control companies by issuing voting preference shares and common shares with multiple
votes.
The Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (hereafter referred to as SECP)
notified a securities law in 2000 that allows companies to not only issue shares with difference
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in dividend rights, but also issue shares with multiple votes. According to the Companies
Share Capital (Variation in Rights and Privileges Rules), 2000, a company shall provide
clauses in the memorandum and articles of association for issuance of shares with difference
in dividend rights, common shares without votes, and common shares with multiple votes
(hereafter referred to as dual class shares)
The second way around the one-share/ one-vote principle is to organize the ownership
structure as a pyramidal structure. The pyramidal ownership structure is a structure in which
an ultimate owner controls several entities by a chain of ownership relations. The ultimate
owner of a company is either the state or a family or an association of persons.
The ownership structure of Fauji Fertilizer Bin Qasim (hereafter referred to as FFBQ) is an
example of a pyramidal ownership structure. I illustrate the ownership structure of FFBQ in
Figure 1. Fauji Fertilizer Company has 50.88 percent shareholding in FFBQ, whereas Fauji
Foundation Trust and National Investment Trust have shareholdings of 17.29 percent and 0.11
percent respectively. The largest shareholder of FFBQ is Fauji Fertilizer Company.
Fauji Foundation Trust, with a shareholding stake of 44.35 percent, is the largest
shareholder of Fauji Fertilizer Company. The analysis of the ownership structure of Fauji
Fertilizer Company (FFC), shows that the Pakistan Army controls FFC and FFBQ, whereas
the state is the ultimate owner of these companies.
National Investment Trust is fully owned by the state. Dispersed refers to the percentage
of outstanding shares held by a large number of individual investors. The category- Public
companies refers to the industrial companies, whose sponsors differ from the sponsors of
FFBQ. The other outside shareholders comprise of non-governmental organizations (NGOs)
and financial companies.
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Figure 1. Fauji Fertilizer Bin Qasim
Voting rights (control rights) of the ultimate owner are 68.29 percent (50.88+17.29+0.11).
Multiplying and summing over all relevant control chains, I come up with 40.05 percent
of cash flow rights (cash flow stake), which is lower than the voting rights. The cash flow
leverage or wedge (ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights of the ultimate owner) in this
example is 1.70.
The ownership structure of Engro Chemicals is illustrated in figure 2. The largest
shareholder of Engro Chemicals is Dawood Hercules Chemicals, which owns 38.13 percent
of the outstanding shares of the company.
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Figure 2. Engro Chemicals
The analysis of the ownership structure of Dawood Hercules Chemicals shows that
Dawood Lawrencepur, with a stake of 16.19 percent, is the largest shareholder of the
company. In order to ascertain the identity of the ultimate owner of Engro Chemicals,
I analyze the ownership structure of Dawood Lawrencepur, which shows that Dawood
Corporation Private Limited, with a shareholding stake of 35.85 percent is its largest
shareholder. According to the information obtained from the records of SECP, Dawood
Corporation Private Limited is fully owned by the sponsoring family. The analysis shows that
the ultimate owner of Engro Chemicals is the family, whose voting rights are 44.26 percent
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(3.62 + 0.73 + 1.78 + 38.13). The cash flow rights of the family in Engro Chemicals are
computed as follows:
CFR = 3.62 + 0.73 + 1.78 + 38.13 × (0.0434 + 0.0898 + 0.0297 + 0.0395 + 0.0003 +
0.1619× (0.2035 + 0.0568 + 0.3583 + 0.0556 + 0.0214 + 0.0213 + 0.0109)) = 18.35.
The cash flow leverage (wedge) in this example is 2.41. The separation of cash flow rights
from voting rights leads to diversion of cash flows that enhances the personal assets of
the owner. As a result of diversion, there is a reduction in the cash flows reinvested in the
company, which accrue to the wealth of shareholders (refer to Almeida and Wolfenzon, 2006,
pp. 2651-2657).
Companies in the lower levels of a pyramidal structure are expected to exhibit poor
performance because owners at the top of the pyramid are empire builders. Another reason
for expecting poor performance is that the distance between the top and a given company in
the pyramid is too large for the owners to monitor the company effectively.
The ownership structure of Maple Leaf Cement is illustrated in Figure 3. Analysis of the
shareholders of Maple Leaf Cement shows that Kohinoor Textile Mills (hereafter referred
to as KTML) is the largest shareholder of the company. KTML owns 50.13 percent of the
shares of Maple Leaf Cement. The sponsoring family owns 0.04 percent of the company’s
shares, whereas Zimpex (Private) Limited owns 0.01 percent of the shares. The information
obtained from the records of SECP shows that Zimpex (Private) Limited (hereafter referred
to as ZPL) is fully owned by the sponsoring family. ZPL’s shareholding in Kohinoor Textile
Mills is 15.47 percent, whereas the family’s shareholding is 14.91 percent. The percentage
voting rights of the owner in Maple Leaf Cement are 50.18 (0.01 + 0.04 + 50.13).
I multiply and sum over all relevant control chains for computing the percentage cash flow
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Figure 3. Maple Leaf Cement
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rights, which are 15.28 (0.01 + 0.04 + 50.13 ∗ (0.1547 + 0.1491)). The cash flow leverage
(wedge) is 3.28.
An ownership panel was setup to provide information on the ownership identity and
percentage shareholdings of largest shareholders and ultimate owners. The results of the
ultimate ownership panel are reported in table I (the column: Largest Shareholder shows the
average percentage ownership whenever these identities are largest shareholders).
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Table I. Number of largest shareholders (n), averages of largest shareholders’ ownership stakes, voting rights (VR),
cash flow rights (CFR), and wedge (cash flow leverage), and percentage of companies owned by ultimate owners
Category n Largest Shareholder VR CFR Wedge Percentage of Cos.
Families 38 48.03 54.35 53.20 1.10 55.20
Foreign 43 61.23 65.86 64.96 1.05 34.40
State 8 60.84 62.06 59.62 1.06 10.40
Public limited Cos. 10 36.25 - - -
Private limited Cos. 13 46.51 - - -
Trusts 5 40.28 - - -
Holding Cos. 5 62.48 - - -
Financial Institutions 2 30.56 - - -
Public Sector
Enterprises
1 45.73 - - -
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2.5 CONCLUDING SECTION
The corporate governance structure of Pakistan has been analyzed in this essay. Although
the corporate governance regime has improved during the period under review, there is a need
for better legal protection of outside shareholders, stricter enforcement of corporate laws, and
improvement in the accounting standards.
Dual class shares have been found in two of the one hundred and twenty five ownership
structures. In addition to dual class shares, nine companies have issued preference shares
without votes. These are redeemable and pay a fixed dividend rate unrelated to the profits
earned during the year.
The ownership structures of Pakistani corporations exhibit a high degree of concentration.
97 percent of the companies have shareholdings of largest shareholders equal to 20 percent
or above.
Applying the concept of ultimate ownership to the structures shows that families own 55
percent of the sample, whereas foreign investors and the state own 34.40 percent and 10.40
percent respectively.
Despite the weakness of corporate governance institutions, there is low evidence of
ownership structures with deviation of cash flow rights from voting rights, which worsens
company performance because of the transfer of resources by ultimate owners from lower
level companies to the top.
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CHAPTER 3
THE EFFECTS OF OWNERSHIP
CONCENTRATION ON PERFORMANCE
ABSTRACT
An important issue in industrial organization is the impact of ownership concentration on
corporate performance. A large sample of publicly listed companies is used for estimating
the effects of ownership concentration on performance in Pakistan. I use panel data analysis
for testing the effects of ownership concentration on corporate performance, which shows
that firm fixed effects is not only safer than ordinary least squares but also safer than random
effects. The fixed effects estimation technique shows that the cash flow rights of ultimate
owners is negative, and the square of cash flow rights is positive. Leverage has a positive
effect on performance. The entrenchment effect dominates the alignment effect till the cash
flow right of 42.97 percent, where the slope of the curve is zero. Above this value the
alignment effect dominates the entrenchment effect. Two important contributions are made to
the literature on the effects of ownership concentration on performance. First, the fixed effects
estimation technique is used for testing the effects of ownership concentration on corporate
performance in Pakistan. Second, the results of this essay are better than existing studies on
South Asian countries because they do not suffer from the endogeneity problem of reverse
causality.
33
Essays on Corporate Governance in Pakistani Corporations
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Tobin introduced the Tobin’s q variable in economics with the intention to examine the
relationship between Tobin’s q and investment. He defined Tobin’s q as the ratio of market
value of a company to the replacement cost of its assets. Tobin argued that companies have
an incentive to invest if Tobin’s q exceeds unity at the margin because the value of the fresh
capital investment is expected to be higher than its cost (please refer to Lindenberg and Ross,
1981; also refer to Tobin, 1978). The pioneering insights of Tobin’s work in macroeconomics
have motivated researchers in microeconometrics to use Tobin’s q or average q for estimating
the relationship between performance and company-specific variables.
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) highlight a new aspect of managerial shareholdings: the
larger the percentage of a company’s shares held by its managers, the more entrenched they
are. They hypothesize that shareholdings of the board of directors have a positive alignment
effect and a negative entrenchment effect.
• Alignment effect: The alignment effect draws on the convergence of interests
hypothesis. The higher the percentage shareholding of the board members, the higher is
the positive effect of a rise in the company’s value on their assets, which enhances their
wealth.
• Entrenchment effect: The higher the percentage shareholding of the board members, the
lesser is the likelihood of them being replaced through a proxy fight or hostile takeover.
This is referred to as entrenchment and results in higher discretion of the members to
pursue their own goals.
Morck et al. (1988) use shareholdings of the board of directors as a proxy for managerial
shareholdings and arrive at a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and
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average q (Tobin’s q).
Several authors have studied the effects of ownership concentration on company perfor-
mance in India. Most of the early studies undertaken on India are at the industry level and
structured in the traditional neo-classical framework. In the last decade a few Indian authors
have exclusively focused on corporate governance in India. Sarkar and Sarkar (2000) focus
on the relationship between the ownership stakes of directors’ and corporate shareholders and
company valuation as measured by the market to book ratio. They find that block-holdings by
directors’ increases company value after a certain level of shareholdings.
Pant and Pattanayak (2007) use a sample of 1833 Indian listed companies for estimating the
impact of ownership variables on company performance as measured by average q (Tobin’s q).
The ownership variables comprise of the fraction of common shares held by the promoters’,
fraction of common shares squared, and fraction of common shares cubed. In accordance
with their hypothesis, average q (Tobin’s q) rises when the percentage shareholding of the
promoters is less than 20 percent. It falls in the interval ranging from 20 percent to less than
49 percent. When the percentage ownership of the sponsors is 49 percent or above, average q
(Tobin’s q) rises again.
In section 2, I specify a model for testing the effects of ownership concentration on
performance. Section 3 contains the summary statistics of the variables. In section 4, I present
the results of the model. Section 5 contains an empirical analysis. Section 6 comprises of the
conclusions of the essay.
3.2 MODEL SPECIFICATION
I use a firm fixed effects model to regress average q (Tobin’s q) on the cash flow rights
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(CFR) of ultimate owners, square of cash flow rights (CFR2), leverage, shareholdings
of outside institutional investors, company size, and growth. Leverage is hypothesized
to affect performance positively because of tax advantages and the disciplinary role of
debt. Institutional investors are expected to improve performance. Size and growth are
expected to have positive coefficients because larger and older companies may have higher
liquidity, more transparency and better disclosure and they receive more attention from equity
analysts. Testing the marginal explanatory power of the variables shows that institutional
shareholdings, size and growth should be excluded from the regression. The regression model
is written in linear form as follows:
qit = αi + β1CFRit + β2CFR
2
it + β3Lit + µit (1)
where qit denotes average q of the ith company in the period t, CFRit denotes the cash flow
right of ultimate owner, CFR2it denotes the square of the cash flow right, Lit denotes the
leverage, and µit denotes the market’s error in evaluating qit.
3.3 DATA
The data were prepared manually from published annual financial reports of the listed
companies and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) was used to convert the variables into real
1991 Rupees. The panels are unbalanced as shares of all the companies are not traded over
the eleven year period. The stock prices data for the eleven years have been prepared from the
records of daily newspapers Dawn and Business Recorder.
Leverage is approximated by the ratio of debt to total assets. Company size is measured by
the natural logarithm of total assets, whereas growth is measured by the percentage change in
annual sales. The statistics and correlation coefficients of the variables, which are significant
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Table II. Statistics of variables and matrix of correlation coefficients
q CFR L
Mean
(Median)
1.62 (1.10) 56.72 (54.92) 0.14 (0.07)
q CFR L
CFR 0.217***
L -0.031 -0.055**
in the regression are reported in table II (triple star (***), double star (**) and single star (*)
denote the significance levels of 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively).
3.4 RESULTS
The fixed effects (FE) regression reports that the global level of average q (Tobin’s q) is 1.63.
The coefficient on cash flow rights (CFR) is negative and significant. Cash flow rights squared
(CFR2) is positive and significant. As per the expectation, leverage is positive and significant.
The null hypothesis that CFR, CFR2, and leverage are jointly zero can be rejected at the one
percent significance level.
The results of the fixed effects regression are reported in table III (the standard errors are
reported in parentheses).
The Chow Test has the null hypothesis that deviations from the global level of average q
(Tobin’s q) are zero. The null hypothesis can be rejected because the probability of the F-
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Table III. Firm Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects Global level (α) CFR CFR2 L P>F obs.
Coeff.(Standard error) 1.63 (0.479) -4.41 (1.648) 5.12 (1.327) 0.63 (0.235) 0.000 1227
p-value 0.001 0.008 0.000 0.008
Chow Test Null Hypothesis F p-value Comment
H0: ui = 0 ∀i 7.77 0.000 Fixed effects
is safer than
ordinary least
squares (OLS)
statistic under this test is 0.000. This shows that the fixed effects model is safer than ordinary
least squares.
I run the fixed effects regression for the sub-sample of families, which accounts for 55
percent of the ultimate ownership. The results of the aforesaid regression are given in table
IV (the standard errors are reported in parentheses).
The global level of average q (Tobin’s q) is 1.41. CFR is negative and significant, whereas
CFR2 is positive and significant. The positive relationship between cash flow rights and
performance beyond a certain threshold may be attributed to the fact that managers are defacto
owners in family-owned companies. Leverage is positive and significant.
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Table IV. Families as ultimate owners: Firm Fixed Effects
Fixed Effects Global level (α) CFR CFR2 L P>F obs.
Coeff.(Standard error) 1.41 (0.482) -5.70 (1.729) 7.493 (1.425) 1.14 (0.273) 0.000 697
p-value 0.004 0.001 0.000 0.000
Chow Test Null Hypothesis F p-value Comment
H0: ui = 0 ∀i 7.79 0.000 Fixed effects
is safer than
ordinary least
squares (OLS)
3.5 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Ownership structures change very slowly over time. The best predictors of the identity of a
company’s largest shareholder and the size of her shareholding in a particular year are the
identity and size of the shareholding last year (refer to Gugler, Mueller, and Yurtoglu, 2004).
Although ownership variables change very slowly, I analyze the percentage changes in the
owners’ cash flow rights over time. The frequency distribution of the changes in the cash flow
rights of owners is illustrated in figure 4.
The figure shows that the cash flow rights of the ultimate owners remained constant over time
for 18.40 percent of the companies. Moreover, 58.40 percent of the companies have shown
changes in the cash flow rights of less than 2 percent. Keeping in view the very low changes
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Figure 4. Percentage changes in the Cash Flow Rights
in the cash flow rights of ultimate owners over time, a way of estimating performance is to
regress1 average q (Tobin’s q) on cash flow right (CFR), square of cash flow rights (CFR2),
leverage, shareholdings of outside institutional investors, company size, and growth using
pooled data.
I run the random effects regression and apply the Hausman Test for comparing random
effects with fixed effects (the results of the random effects regression are not reported to save
space). The Hausman Test tests the null hypothesis2 that the coefficients estimated by the
efficient random effects (RE) estimator are the same as the ones estimated by the consistent
fixed effects (FE) estimator. The results of the Hausman Test are reported in table V.
40
Corporate Governance
Table V. Hausman Test
Hausman Test Null Hypothesis Chi-square p-value comment
Random effects
(RE) vs Fixed
effects (FE)
H0: coefficients estimated by
the efficient RE estimator are
same as the ones estimated by
the consistent FE estimator
23.19 0.000 FE is safer than RE
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3.6 CONCLUDING SECTION
Testing the effects of ownership concentration on performance using a fixed effects estimation
technique shows that the cash flow right (CFR) of ultimate owner is negative and significant,
and the square of cash flow right (CFR2) is positive and significant. As per the prediction of
theory, leverage has a positive effect on performance.
This is the first essay in the case of Pakistan that uses analyses based on panel data for
studying unobserved heterogeneity at the company level. The analysis shows that the firm
fixed effects model is not only safer than ordinary least squares but also safer than random
effects.
An important feature of this essay is that the results do not suffer from the endogeneity
problem of structural reverse causality (refer to Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). The findings are
better than the existing studies on South Asian countries, whose results are based on the
ordinary least squares model (refer to Sarkar and Sarkar, 2000, please see Pant and Patyanak,
2007). The use of the fixed effects estimation technique is a prudent way of dealing with the
endogeneity problem of structural reverse causality.
The graph from the results of the fixed effects regression is illustrated in figure 5.
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Figure 5. Cash Flow Rights of Ultimate Owners and Average q (Tobin’s q)
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25.60 percent of the companies fall in the interval upto 42.97 percent where the entrench-
ment effect dominates the alignment effect. Above this level, the alignment effect dominates
the entrenchment effect and the owners have greater interest in managing the operations of
the company in an efficient manner because they have to bear a greater proportion of a one
rupee loss.
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Chapter 4
Impact of Ownership Concentration on
Performance
ABSTRACT
An important contribution is made to the literature on the effects of ownership variables
on performance as a marginal return on investment, namely a marginal q, is used for
studying the impact of ownership identity and concentration on the performance of Pakistani
corporations. Family-owned companies earned returns on investment of 88 percent of their
cost of capital, which shows the presence of agency costs in their governance structures. The
returns on investment of family-owned companies are lower than the returns of foreign-owned
companies. The state-owned companies earned returns on investment of only 65 percent of
their cost of capital, which shows that state control negatively affects performance. The use of
marginal q for estimating the relationship between ownership concentration and performance
ensures that the causal relationship runs from the former to the latter. Testing the effects of
ownership concentration on performance shows that the cash flow rights of owners is positive,
and the square of cash flow rights is negative. There is strong evidence of entrenchment as
the entrenchment effect dominates the alignment effect for 56.80 percent of the companies.
In view of Pakistan’s poor rating on contract enforcement (1.66), the strong evidence on the
agency problem of entrenchment has repercussions for the protection of outside shareholders.
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4.1 INTRODUCTION
Companies in developing countries face different investment opportunities than the
companies in the developed countries. In the latter, mature companies have limited investment
opportunities, which may force managers to over invest in the company’s existing line of
business or undertake unprofitable diversification into new lines of business.
On the other hand, a developing country may have many companies with sufficiently
attractive investment opportunities so that no conflict between insiders and outside
shareholders arises over the investment levels. Investors expect corporate investments to yield
high returns. For this reason, they are willing to buy the shares of companies in developing
countries even without strong legal or regulatory protection and the need arises for studying
investment performance from the perspective of investors. In this essay, I use a measure
of marginal return on investment (ratio of a company’s return on investment to its cost of
capital) for studying performance and for estimating the relationship between ownership
concentration and performance.
Section 2 presents hypotheses on performance. Section 3 comprises of a model for
estimation of performance and a model for estimating the alignment and entrenchment effects
of ownership. In section 4, I present summary statistics of variables and explain disclosures
such as equity issues and expenditures on intangibles. Section 5 comprises of hypothesis
testing. In section 6, I present an empirical analysis of performance. Section 7 comprises of
evidence on the agency problem of entrenchment. Conclusions are drawn in the final section
of the essay.
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4.2 HYPOTHESES
Hypothesis 1 (a)
The investment performance of family-owned companies is worse than the performance of
foreign-owned companies.
Insiders of foreign-owned companies have higher motivation to carry out operations consci-
entiously as compared to family-owned companies.
Hypothesis 1 (b)
The performance of family-owned companies is better than the performance of state-owned
companies.
Insiders of family-owned companies have higher motivation to carry out operations consci-
entiously as compared to state-owned companies.
4.3 MEASUREMENT OF INVESTMENT PERFORMANCE
I estimate performance by using a marginal return on investment- the ratio of a company’s
return on investment to its cost of capital (refer to Mueller and Reardon, 1993). Suppose It is
a company’s investment in period t, then its present value in period t is defined in equation 1
as follows:
PVt ≡
∞∑
j=1
Ct+j
(1 + it)j
(2)
Where PVt is the present value of this investment It in the period (t), Ct+j is the cash flow
generated from It in period (t+ j), and it is the company’s cost of capital in period (t).
As the capital market is assumed to be efficient, it makes an unbiased estimate of the present
value of any investment in period t. One can then use the market’s estimate of the present value
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(PVt) and the investment (It) that created it, to calculate the ratio of a pseudo-permanent
return (rt) on It to the company’s cost of capital as defined in equation 2 below:
PVt =
rt.It
it
= qmtIt (3)
Where rt is the pseudo-permanent return on It and it is the company’s cost of capital.
Equation 2 gives the ratio of the return rt on It to it. If the company had invested the same
amount It in a project that produced a permanent return rt this project would have yielded
exactly the same present value as the one actually undertaken. The ratio of rt to it, qmt, is
the key statistic in my analysis. If a company maximizes shareholder wealth, then it does not
undertake an investment that has a qmt of less than one. I define the company’s market value
in equation 3 as follows:
Mt =Mt−1 + PVt − δtMt−1 + µt (4)
Where Mt is the market value of the company at the end of period t, PVt is the present value
of It , δt is the depreciation rate for the firm’s total capital, and µt is the market’s error in
evaluating Mt.
Subtracting Mt−1 from both sides of (3) and using equation 2 to replace PVt with qmtIt
yields equation 4:
Mt −Mt−1 = qmtIt − δtMt−1 + µt (5)
Where Mt −Mt−1 is the change in the company’s market value during the period (t), and
qmt (marginal q) is the ratio of rt to it.
The assumption of capital market efficiency implies that the expected value of µt is zero.
Setting µt equal to zero and rearranging (4) yields:
qmt =
Mt − (1− δ)Mt−1
It
(6)
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Marginal q is the change in the market value of the company divided by the change in the
capital stock It that caused it. If a company’s cost of capital, it is 0.10, δt = 0 and it invests
100 at a return rt = 0.12. The predicted increase in the market value using (4) is then 120
and qmt is equal to 1.2.
A company’s market value rises by more than the amount invested whenever rt > it, and
falls short of the value of It when rt < it, abstracting from depreciation.
There are two benefits of using this model. The first benefit is that there is no need to
calculate the cost of capital for measuring performance. The second benefit is that it allows
for differences in risks across companies. Dividing both sides of (4) by Mt−1 yields equation
6, which is stated below:
Mt −Mt−1
Mt−1
= −δ + qm
It
Mt−1
+
µt
Mt−1
(7)
Where Mt−Mt−1
Mt−1
is the change in the market value during the year t relative to the market
value in the previous year (Mt−1), −δ is the depreciation, qm is the marginal q, and µt is the
market’s error in evaluating the change in the company’s market value.
It is hypothesized in equation 6 that the change in market value of the company during the
given year t is because of investment during the year, depreciation in the value of assets and
factors other than investment, which are accounted for by the error term (µt). Equation 6 may
be used to estimate both the depreciation rate and marginal q under the assumption that they
are constant across companies or over time, or both.
A company’s market value represents the market’s evaluation of the total assets of the
company. Market value of a company at the end of the accounting year t, Mt is defined
as the sum of the market value of outstanding common shares, market or book value of
outstanding preference shares, and book value of outstanding debt. Therefore, I use an equally
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comprehensive measure of investment, which is defined as follows in equation 7 below:
I = CF +∆D +∆PS +∆CS +RND +ADV (8)
Where CF is the cash flow3, ∆D is the enhancement or repayment of debt, ∆PS is cash
received from issues of preference shares or the cash used for their redemption and ∆CS is
the cash received from issues of common shares (please see section on data for information
on disclosure of cash received from issue of share capital).
Research and development (RND) and advertising (ADV) expenditures are added because
they are also forms of investment that produce intangible capital, which contributes to
a company’s market value. They are included in equation 7 to obtain a measure of the
company’s addition to its total capital. Depreciation also accounts for depletion of the
intangible capital because of imitation.
The annual change in a company’s market value is partly due to random changes in the stock
market’s sentiment. These changes in the market sentiment affect the market’s valuation of
the company’s assets. In order to correct for these changes, I transform each variable in each
year as a deviation from the sample mean.
Incentive and Entrenchment Effects Model
I present a model for estimating the impact of the ultimate owner’s stake in the company on
performance. The ultimate owner’s stake leads to a positive alignment effect and a negative
entrenchment effect, which are described below:
Alignment effect: The higher the percentage shareholding of the sponsoring owners, the
higher is the positive effect of a rise in the company’s value on their assets. This effect draws
on the convergence of interests hypothesis and gives incentives to the owners for managing
the company’s operations in an efficient manner.
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Entrenchment effect: The higher the percentage shareholding of the sponsoring directors, the
lesser is the likelihood of them being replaced by outside shareholders. The entrenchment
effect leads to higher discretion of the owners to pursue their own goals.
I argue that the cash flow right (CFR) of the owner captures the alignment effect as well as
the entrenchment effect because of the lack of separation of management from owners. The
squared term of cash flow rights (CFR2) is also used in the model.
Intuitively, outside institutional investors are expected to be interested in improving
performance. Testing the marginal explanatory power of institutional shareholdings (IT)
shows that this variable should be excluded from the regression (please see appendix for the
method used for testing the explanatory power of IT). The company size variable is measured
by the natural logarithm of total assets.
The model discussed above is given in equation form below (refer to the appendix for
derivation of the equation).
Mt−Mt−1
Mt−1
= β0 + β1CFR.
It
Mt−1
+β2CFR
2. It
Mt−1
+ β3S.
It
Mt−1
+ µt
(9)
Where Mt−Mt−1
Mt−1
is the ratio of the change in market value in period t to the market value in
t− 1, CFR is the cash flow rights of owners, CFR2 is the square of cash flow rights, and S
is company size.
4.4 DATA
The data were prepared manually from published annual financial reports of the listed
companies and the Consumer Price Index (CPI) was used to convert the variables into real
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1991 Rupees. The panels are unbalanced as shares of all the companies are not traded over
the eleven year period. The stock prices data for the eleven years have been prepared from the
records of daily newspapers Dawn and Business Recorder.
The annual report of a listed company discloses the amount of cash generated during
the year by issue of common shares. Moreover, there is disclosure of the cash received
from issue of preference shares and the cash used for redemption of shares. The maximum
number of issues of common shares during the eleven year period is seven. The research
and development and advertising expenditures are also disclosed in the annual report. The
percentage of companies in the sample that spend on research and development (RND) is 23
percent. 85 percent of the companies spend on advertising (ADV).
The statistics and correlation coefficients of the variables used in the empirical analysis
are reported in Table VI (triple star (***), double star (**) and single star (*) denote the
significance levels of 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent respectively).
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Table VI. Statistics of variables and matrix of correlation coefficients
Mt−Mt−1
Mt−1
It
Mt−1
CFR S
Mean
(Median)
0.22 (0.08) 0.23 (0.14) 56.72 (54.92) 15.82 (15.80)
Mt−Mt−1
Mt−1
It
Mt−1
CFR S
It
Mt−1
0.552***
CFR 0.066*** -0.050
S 0.056 -0.053 -0.080***
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The above information on the sources of information and the process of collection, shows
the reliability of the ownership, financial and prices data used in the econometric modeling of
the essay.
4.5 HYPOTHESES TESTING
In order to test hypotheses 1 (a) and 1 (b), I define the dummy variables IdFOR and IdSTATE .
The variable IdFOR takes on the value one if a company has foreign ownership and zero
otherwise. IdSTATE takes on the value one for a company owned by the state and zero
otherwise. IdFOR and IdSTATE are interacted with ItMt−1 . The regression equation used for
testing the hypotheses is given below:
Mt−Mt−1
Mt−1
= −δ + qm
It
Mt−1
+ βIDFOR.
It
Mt−1
+ΓIDSTATE.
It
Mt−1
+ µt
Mt−1
(10)
Where Mt−Mt−1
Mt−1
is the change in the market value during the year t relative to the market
value in the previous year (Mt−1), −δ is the depreciation, IDFOR. ItMt−1 and IDSTATE . ItMt−1
are interaction terms of the dummy variables IdFOR and IdSTATE with ItMt−1 , and µt is the
market’s error in evaluating the change in the company’s market value.
The results of Panel 1 are reported in Table VII (the standard errors are reported in parenthe-
ses). Panel 1’s robust regression4 reports that depreciation is -0.06, which is significant. The
joint hypothesis that the coefficients on It
Mt−1
, IdFOR.
It
Mt−1
, and IdSTATE . ItMt−1 are zero can
be rejected at the one percent significance level (p-value against the joint hypothesis test is
0.000). The return on investment is 0.88, which is significant. The coefficient on IdFOR. ItMt−1
(β) is significant and positive, which is evidence in favor of hypothesis 1.
The null hypothesis in the one-tailed t test is that β is negative or zero and it can be rejected
at the one percent significance level (p-value is 0.000). The one-tailed t test gives evidence
54
Corporate Governance
Table VII. PANEL 1
It
Mt−1
IdFOR.
It
Mt−1
/
IdSTATE .
It
Mt−1
p-value Dep. P>F Adj.R2
Return on
Investment
0.88(0.048) 0.000 -0.00(0.018) 0.000 0.29
Difference
of Foreign
0.36(0.088) 0.000
Difference
of State
-0.02(0.157) 0.837
that the returns for foreign-owned companies are higher than the returns for family-owned
companies.
The robust regression for Panel 1 shows that IdFOR. ItMt−1 is positive and significant (the
results of the robust regression are not reported for saving space). The robust regression
substantiates the evidence in favor of hypothesis 1.
Another explanation for the better performance of foreign-owned companies is that they
receive transfers of management expertise and skills from abroad. Family-owned companies
do not receive any of the aforesaid transfers.
There is no evidence of hypothesis 1 (b) because the coefficient on the interaction term
IdSTATE .
It
Mt−1
(Γ) is insignificant.
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Table VIII. PANEL 2
PANEL 2 It
Mt−1
IdPUBLIC .
It
Mt−1
p-value Dep. P>F Adj.R2
Return on Investment 0.96(0.044) 0.000 -0.00(0.018) 0.000 0.28
Difference of Public -0.14(0.161) 0.383
Robust regression It
Mt−1
IdPUBLIC .
It
Mt−1
p-value Dep. P>F
Return on Investment 0.97(0.026) 0.000 -0.08(0.010) 0.000
Difference of Public -0.16(0.089) 0.070
4.6 EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
A triple5 agency problem applies to the companies owned by the public (state-owned
companies). Keeping in view the nature of the agency problem, companies owned by the
public are more likely to suffer from entrenchment as compared to companies owned by
private entities. For comparing the performance of companies owned by the public with
the performance of companies owned by private entities, we define the dummy variable
IdPUBLIC , which takes on the value one for a company owned by the public and zero
otherwise. The results of Panel 2 are reported in Table VIII (the standard errors are reported
in parentheses).
In panel 2, the return on investment is 0.96, which is significant. This panel’s robust
regression shows that depreciation is -0.08, which is significant. The return on investment
is 0.97, which is significant. According to the panel’s robust regression, the coefficient on the
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Table IX. PANEL 3
Dep. qmI p-value (qmI ) Obs. P>F Adj.R2
Full sample -0.00(0.013) 0.98(0.040) 0.000 1227 0.000 0.31
interaction term of the dummy variable IdPUBLIC with ItMt−1 (IdPUBLIC . ItMt−1 ) is negative
and marginally significant.
The null hypothesis in the one-tailed t test is that IdPUBLIC . ItMt−1 is negative or zero and
it cannot be rejected (p-value is 0.965). There is evidence that the performance of companies
owned by the public (state-owned companies) is worse than the performance of companies
owned by private entities.
In accordance with equation 6, Mt−Mt−1
Mt−1
is regressed on It
Mt−1
in panel 3. The results of
panel 3 are reported in Table IX (the standard errors are reported in parentheses). Return
on investment is 0.96, which is significant. The robust regression for this panel reports that
depreciation is -0.06, which is significant. The return on investment is 0.96 that is significant.
The estimated error in the aforesaid equation is uncorrelated with It
Mt−1
(coefficient of
correlation is -0.000).
In section 4, investment was hypothesized to enhance the market value of the company.
Theoretically, a company’s investment is positive. Empirically, investment may not be positive
because of losses incurred during the year. I run the regression using the variables Mt−Mt−1
Mt−1
and It
Mt−1
for the non-negative values of the latter variable. In this panel, I use the regression
variables without the transformation of Mt−Mt−1
Mt−1
and It
Mt−1
as deviations from the annual
sample means. The robust regression reports that depreciation is -0.09. The return on
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Table X. PANEL 4
Dep. qmI p-value (qmI ) Obs. P>F Adj.R2
I > 0 -0.00(0.018) 0.96 (0.044) 0.000 1211 0.000 0.27
investment is 0.96, which is significant. The results of panel 4 are reported in Table X (the
standard errors are reported in parentheses).
The depreciation in a company’s market value during a given year depends on the nature
of the capital that is invested in. The nature of capital depends on the industry, in which the
company operates. In order to find evidence for this intuition, I run the regression with a full
set of industry dummies using Mt−Mt−1
Mt−1
and It
Mt−1
variables without the above-mentioned
transformation. The regression equation used in this panel is as follows:
Mt−Mt−1
Mt−1
= −δ + α1IND1 + α2IND2
+.......+ αn−1INDn−1 + qm
It
Mt−1
+ µt
Mt−1
(11)
Where Mt−Mt−1
Mt−1
is the change in the market value during the year t relative to the market
value in the previous year (Mt−1), −δ is the depreciation, INDi is a dummy variable that
takes on the value one for industry i and zero otherwise, and qm is the marginal q.
Table XI presents the results of panel 5, which reports the differences of depreciation across
industries (the standard errors are reported in parentheses). Panel 5 reports that depreciation
is -0.08 and the investment return is 0.96. The robust regression shows that depreciation is
-0.13, which is significant.
With the exception of the tobacco and oil and gas exploration industries, the coefficients
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Table XI. Depreciation differences across industries (PANEL 5)
Industry −δ / αi p-value qmI Adj.R2 robust regres-
sion: estimates
Technology and com-
munication
-0.08(0.096) 0.382 0.95 (0.044) 0.28 -0.13(0.053)
Synthetic and Rayon -0.01(0.115) 0.902 -0.01(0.090)
Textile Composite 0.02(0.108) 0.836 0.01(0.085)
Textile Spinning -0.01(0.143) 0.956 0.01(0.112)
Textile Weaving -0.02(0.191) 0.902 0.05(0.146)
Jute 0.17(0.185) 0.346 0.18(0.142)
Cooking Oil -0.01(0.184) 0.970 0.03(0.141)
Sugar 0.01(0.118) 0.908 0.01(0.093)
Transport 0.12(0.140) 0.371 0.03(0.110)
Engineering 0.08(0.124) 0.514 0.04(0.097)
Fertilizer 0.16(0.124) 0.194 0.11(0.098)
Refinery 0.02(0.129) 0.894 -0.01(0.101)
Oil and Gas Marketing 0.03(0.123) 0.748 -0.00(0.096)
Oil and Gas Explo-
ration
0.13(0.137) 0.029 0.09(0.108)
Power 0.05(0.124) 0.667 0.03(0.097)
Paper 0.03(0.132) 0.825 -0.00(0.103)
Glass 0.06(0.184) 0.706 0.20(0.141)
Tobacco -0.33(0.147) 0.024 -0.19(0.115)
Cement 0.10(0.103) 0.334 0.07(0.081)
Cable and Electric 0.14(0.132) 0.281 0.02(0.103)
Chemicals 0.05(0.111) 0.613 0.01(0.087)
Pharmaceuticals 0.12(0.118) 0.320 0.08(0.093)
Food and Care 0.10(0.111) 0.368 0.04(0.087)
Automobile 0.16(0.107) 0.138 0.01(0.084)
Services 0.06(0.066) 0.356 0.07(0.093)
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on the dummy variables of the industries are insignificant. These industries account for 5.60
percent of the sample. Furthermore, the robust regression reports that all the industry dummy
variables are insignificant except for the tobacco industry, whose share in the sample is 1.60
percent.
I add interaction terms of industry dummy variables with It
Mt−1
(INDi. ItMt−1 ) to the
regression in equation 6 and run the regression using the variables Mt−Mt−1
Mt−1
and It
Mt−1
without the transformation as deviations from the annual sample means. With the exception of
textile composite and automobile industries all interaction terms are insignificant (the results
are not reported to save space).
Intuitively, depreciation may vary from company to company. I run the fixed effects
regression and the regression’s Chow test shows that ordinary least squares is better than
fixed effects for the sample data. I apply the Hausman test for comparing fixed effects with
random effects (the results of the fixed effects and random effects are not shown in tabular
form to save space). This test shows that fixed effects is safer than random effects. The results
of the Chow test and Hausman test are reported in Table XII.
For estimating the difference of the return for companies with cash flow leveraging (wedge)
from the companies with cash flow rights equal to voting rights, I define a dummy variable
wedge. This variable takes on the value one for companies with cash flow leveraging and zero
otherwise. I add an interaction term of wedge with It
Mt−1
to the regression in equation 6 and
run the resulting regression, which shows that wedge. It
Mt−1
is insignificant (the full results are
not shown to save space).
For estimating the return for internally financed investment, I define a dummy variable
internal that takes on the value one for investment fully financed by cash flow and zero
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Table XII. Chow Test and Hausman Test
Chow Test Null Hypothesis F p-value comment
H0: ui = 0 ∀i 1.07 0.2979 ordinary least squares
(OLS) is safer than
fixed effects
Hausman Test Null Hypothesis Chi-square p-value comment
Random effects
(RE) vs Fixed
effects (FE)
H0: coefficients estimated by
the efficient RE estimator are
same as the ones estimated by
the consistent FE estimator
5.50 0.019 FE is safer than RE
Table XIII. PANEL 6
It
Mt−1
IdInternal.
It
Mt−1
p-value Dep. P>F Adj.R2
Return on
Investment
0.77(0.057) 0.000 -0.05(0.008) 0.000 0.31
Difference
for
internally
financed
0.29(0.079) 0.000
otherwise. When the regression in equation 6 is run with internal interacted with It
Mt−1
, the
interaction term (internal. It
Mt−1
) is positive. There is no evidence of discretionary investment
policies as the sign of the coefficient on the interaction term is contrary to the expectation.
The results of Panel 6 are reported in Table XIII.
I analyze difference of the performance of state-owned companies, which have the Fauji
Foundation Trust6 as the largest shareholder or as the controlling entity of the largest
shareholder from the other state companies, which has been illustrated in figure 1 (pyramidal
ownership structure of Fauji Fertilizer Bin Qasim). This charitable trust has been organized
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Table XIV. PANEL 7
It
Mt−1
IdTrust.
It
Mt−1
p-value Dep. P>F Adj.R2
Return on
Investment
0.65(0.152) 0.000 -0.05(0.024) 0.000 0.37
Difference
for fauji
foundation
trust
0.39(0.208) 0.064
to operate on a self-sustaining basis and so the companies owned by the trust are treated as
distinct from the other companies. I define a dummy variable trust that takes on the value
one if a company has the fauji foundation trust as the largest shareholder or as the controlling
entity of the largest shareholder and zero otherwise. I run the regression in equation 6 for the
sub-sample of companies owned by the public (state-owned companies) after interacting the
dummy variable trust with It
Mt−1
.
The results of panel 7 are reported in Table XIV (the standard errors are reported in
parentheses). Depreciation is -0.05, whereas depreciation in the panel’s robust regression
is -0.07. The return on investment for state companies is 0.65, which is significant. In the
one-tailed t test the null hypothesis is that the coefficient on the interaction term- trust. It
Mt−1
is negative or zero. This hypothesis can be rejected at the 5 percent significance level (p-value
is 0.032).
Findings
There is evidence that the agency problem of entrenchment in companies owned by the
public negatively affects investment performance. When return on investment is estimated by
using the positive values of investment, the estimate is not different from the regression for
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the full sample. This shows that companies have been able to sustain the operating as well as
non-operating expenditures. Applying the Chow test shows that ordinary least squares (OLS)
is better than fixed effects. This evidence in favor of pooling of data adds strength to the
results pertaining to investment returns.
The main finding is that depreciation does not differ across 98.40 percent of the sample.
4.7 INCENTIVE AND ENTRENCHMENT EFFECTS
In this section, I present results of the model on the impact of ultimate owners’ cash flow
stakes on performance (refer to table XV in the appendix for results of panel 8). The
coefficient on CFR. It
Mt−1
is positive and significant. The robust regression for this panel
reports that CFR. It
Mt−1
is positive and significant.
As per the expectation, the coefficient on CFR2. It
Mt−1
is negative7 and significant.
According to the robust regression, this variable is negative and significant. In view of the
result that CFR2. It
Mt−1
is unambiguously negative, there is evidence of entrenchment.
The variable S. It
Mt−1
is positive and significant. The robust regression reports that this
variable is positive and significant.
In order to check for differences of results across the categories of ownership, I in-
teract the dummy variables IdFOR and IdSTATE with CFR. ItMt−1 , and CFR
2. It
Mt−1
.
When the regression in equation 8 is run with IdFOR.CFR. ItMt−1 , IdSTATE .CFR.
It
Mt−1
,
IdFOR.CFR
2. It
Mt−1
, and IdSTATE .CFR2. ItMt−1 , these interaction terms are insignificant
(the results are not reported to save space).
The return on investment function is illustrated in figure 6 (please see appendix for figure
6). The alignment effect dominates the entrenchment effect till the cash flow rights value
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of 52.43 percent, where the slope of the curve is zero. Above this value, there is evidence
that the entrenchment effect dominates the alignment effect. The intuitive explanation of the
dominance of the entrenchment effect is that owners have higher discretion in pursuing their
own goals.
4.8 CONCLUDING SECTION
Family-owned companies earned returns on investment of 88 percent of their cost of capital,
which shows the presence of agency costs in their governance structures. The returns
on investment of family-owned companies are lower than the returns of foreign-owned
companies.
Returns of companies owned by the public (state-owned companies) are lower than the
returns of companies owned by private entities. There is evidence that the nature of agency
problem in state-owned companies negatively affects performance.
I find that state control has a negative effect on performance. The state-owned companies
earned returns on investment of only 65 percent of their cost of capital. The fact that the
returns fall far short of the costs of capital implies over-investments or poor investments in
state companies. The state-owned companies with the Fauji Foundation Trust as the largest
shareholder or as the controlling entity of the largest shareholder perform better than the other
state-owned companies.
Testing the effects of ownership concentration on performance shows that the cash flow
rights of owners is positive, and the square of cash flow rights is negative. There is
evidence of entrenchment. I have used the marginal q measure for estimating the impact of
ownership concentration on performance, which ensures that causality runs from ownership
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to performance.
For 56.80 percent of the companies, the entrenchment effect is dominant over the alignment
(incentive) effect, which is strong evidence of entrenchment. In view of Pakistan’s poor rating
on contract enforcement, the strong evidence on the agency problem of entrenchment has
repercussions for the protection of outside shareholders.
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NOTES
1. I do not report the results of pooled regressions using average q (Tobin’s q) and
ownership variables because they may be endogenously determined. Some studies try
to determine the direction of the relationship between performance and ownership
by using instrumental variables (IV) estimations. However, it is very difficult to find
uncontroversial instruments, which are related to ownership but not to performance.
2. If the probability greater than chi-square is 0.05 or larger, the null hypothesis cannot be
rejected and it is safe to use random effects. If we get a probability below 0.05, the null
hypothesis is rejected and fixed effects should be used.
3. Cash flow is defined as profits after taxes plus depreciation expense, plus amortization
expense, plus royalty expense, plus cash raised from disposal of assets minus gain on
disposal of assets minus tax and dividend payments.
4. I run the robust regression by using the robust regression command: qreg in stata (see
Hamilton, 1992).
5. A triple agency problem applies to the companies owned by the public i.e. parliament
members are agents of citizens, bureaucrats are agents of parliament members and
managers are agents of bureaucrats. Keeping in view the nature of the agency problem in
companies owned by the public, managers have more discretion to indulge in on-the-job
consumption as compared to managers of companies owned by private entities.
6. The fauji foundation trust is a welfare organization (refer to the foundation’s website
www.fauji.org.pk. for its profile). This charitable trust has been organized to operate on
a self-sustaining basis and so the companies controlled by the trust should be treated as
distinct from the other state-owned companies.
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7. I run the regression in equation 8 with the interaction terms of industry dummy
variables with CFR2. It
Mt−1
(INDi.CFR2. ItMt−1 ). All the aforesaid interaction terms
are insignificant except for the automobile industry (the results are not reported to save
space).
-
APPENDIX
Definitions
• Leverage is the ratio of a company’s long term debt to its total assets.
• Company size is the logarithm of total assets.
• Tobin’s q is defined as the ratio of a company’s market value to the book value of its
assets.
The return on investment of a company is a function of CFR, CFR2, company size (S),
institutional shareholdings (IT), leverage (L), research and development expenditure (RND),
and advertising and sales promotion expenditure (ADV). Substituting this function into
equation 6 yields a series of interaction terms between a company’s It
Mt−1
and each of the
above-mentioned variable. The equation is given below:
Mt−Mt−1
Mt−1
= β0 + β1CFR.
It
Mt−1
+ β2CFR
2. It
Mt−1
+ β3S.
It
Mt−1
+ β4IT.
It
Mt−1
+ β5L.
It
Mt−1
+β6RND.
It
Mt−1
+ β7ADV.
It
Mt−1
+ µt
(12)
Where Mt−Mt−1
Mt−1
is the ratio of the change in market value in period t to the market value in
t − 1, CFR is the cash flow rights of owners, CFR2 is the square of cash flow rights, S is
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Table XV. Incentive and entrenchment effects of ownership
Panel 8
Variable Coefficient (standard error) p-value
CFR× It
Mt−1
4.32 (1.001) 0.000
CFR2 × It
Mt−1
-4.11 (0.815) 0.000
S × It
Mt−1
0.12 (0.031) 0.000
Adj-R2 0.34
company size, IT is the percentage shareholdings of outside institutional investors, L is the
leverage, RND is the research and development expenditure, and ADV is the advertising
expenditure.
I test the marginal explanatory power of each of these variables in the regression by using
the test command in Stata. The null hypothesis (H0), β4 = 0 cannot be rejected as the p-value
is 0.8560 and IT. It
Mt−1
should be excluded from the regression. The null hypothesis (H0),
β5 = 0 cannot be rejected as the p-value is 0.8664 and L. ItMt−1 must not be used. Likewise
the null hypothesis (H0), β6 = 0 cannot be rejected as the p-value is 0.999 and RND. ItMt−1
should not be used. Similarly, the null hypothesis (H0), β7 = 0 cannot be rejected as the
p-value is 0.116 and ADV. It
Mt−1
should not be used (the definitions, summary statistics and
correlation coefficients of the extra (insignificant) variables are not reported to save space).
The results of Panel 8 are given in table XV (the standard errors are reported in parentheses).
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Figure 6. The relationship between return on investment and cash flow rights of ultimate owners
The graph of the return on investment function has been prepared from the results of the
quantile regression by using the average values of the explanatory variables. This graph is
illustrated in figure 6.
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Figure 7. Origin of foreign investors
None of the foreign investors have state as the ultimate owner. The country of origin of
foreign owners is illustrated in figure 7.
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ABSTRACT
Ein wichtiger Beitrag zur Literatur wird insofern gemacht, als dass die alignment
(Anpassungs-) und entrenchment (Abwehr-) Effekte aufgrund der Eigentmerstruktur auf
die Rendite von Investitionsentscheidungen untersucht werden. Dafr wird die Theorie des
Grenznutzens einer Investition (marginal q) in Bezug auf die Leistung pakistanischer
Unternehmen verwendet. Unternehmen in Familienbesitz erzielen eine Rendite ihrer
Investitionen von 88 percent der Kosten ihres Kapitals, was auf das Vorhandensein
von agency costs in ihrer governance (Fhrungs-) Struktur schlieen lsst. Ein wichtiges
Resultat ist, dass die Rendite der Investitionen von Unternehmen im Familienbesitz
niedriger ist als jene von Unternehmen mit auslndischen Eigentmern. Bei in Staatsbesitz
befindlichen Unternehmen betrgt die Rendite von Investitionen nur 65 percent ihrer
Kapitalkosten, woraus geschlossen werden kann, dass sich Kontrolle durch den Staat
negativ auf die Unternehmensfhrung auswirkt. Die Verwendung des marginal q fr die
Schtzung der Beziehung zwischen Eigentmerschaft und Performance garantiert, dass ein
kausaler Zusammenhang in diese Richtung besteht. Statistische Tests der Effekte der
Eigentmerstruktur auf die Unternehmensperformance zeigen, dass die Rechte der Eigentmer
in Bezug auf den Cash flow eindeutig positiv, und jene in Bezug auf den quadrierten
Cash Flows eindeutig negativ sind. Es zeigt sich eine starke Evidenz fr das Vorhandensein
von entrenchment, da der entrenchment-Effekt den alignment (Anreiz-)-Effekt in 56.8
percent der Unternehmen dominiert. In Anbetracht von Pakistans schlechtem Rating bezglich
Vertragsvollzug (1.66), hat die starke Evidenz von agency-Problemen Auswirkungen auf den
Schutz von fremden Eigentmern.
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